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  FUTURE	
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  V.	
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Shyamkrishna	
  Balganesh*	
  

INTRODUCTION:	
  THE	
  “GHOSTLY	
  PRESENCE”	
  OF	
  INS	
  V.	
  AP	
  
Ever since its genesis in the Supreme Court’s famous decision in
International News Service v. Associated Press,1 the “hot news”
misappropriation doctrine has had to fight for its survival. First came Judge
Learned Hand, who in a series of opinions, took the position that International
News did not lay down a “general doctrine,” but was instead meant to be
limited to the peculiarities of the newspaper industry.2 Next came the Court’s
decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, where it abrogated all “federal
general common law,” the very body of law within which the hot news
misappropriation doctrine had been developed.3 The doctrine then appeared to
have been resuscitated in 1997, when the Second Circuit breathed new life into
it as a part of New York’s state common law in NBA v. Motorola, Inc.4
Finding that the doctrine had managed to “survive,” the court in that case
sought to develop it into a viable cause of action, and parsed it into its
constituent elements.5 Other courts seemed to then follow the Second Circuit’s
lead on this.6
Most recently, the Second Circuit, in Barclays Capital Inc. v.
Theflyonthewall.com effectively reconsidered its decision in NBA, albeit in
relation to different subject matter, and in so doing narrowed the doctrine even
further.7 In its decision, the court paid close attention to the language and
*

Assistant	
  Professor	
  of	
  Law,	
  University	
  of	
  Pennsylvania	
  Law	
  School.	
  
1. 248	
  U.S.	
  215	
  (1918).	
  
2. See,	
  e.g.,	
  Cheney	
  Bros.	
  v.	
  Doris	
  Silk	
  Corp.,	
  35	
  F.2d	
  279,	
  280	
  (2d	
  Cir.	
  1929).	
  
3. 304	
  U.S.	
  64,	
  79	
  (1938).	
  
4. 105	
  F.3d	
  841	
  (2d	
  Cir.	
  1997).	
  
5. Id.	
  at	
  843	
  (holding	
  “narrow	
  ‘hot	
  news’	
  exception	
  does	
  survive	
  preemption”).	
  
6. See,	
   e.g.,	
   Associated	
   Press	
   v.	
   All	
   Headline	
   News	
   Corp.,	
   608	
   F.	
   Supp.	
   2d	
   454,	
   459	
  
(S.D.N.Y.	
   2009)	
   (recognizing	
   NBA	
   v.	
   Motorola	
   as	
   maintaining	
   hot	
   news	
   misappropriation	
  
cause	
   of	
   action);	
   X17,	
   Inc.	
   v.	
   Lavandeira,	
   563	
   F.	
   Supp.	
   2d	
   1102,	
   1105–07	
   (C.D.	
   Cal.	
   2007)	
  
(concluding	
   that	
   California	
   too	
   recognizes	
   hot	
   news	
   misappropriation	
   as	
   set	
   out	
   in	
   NBA);	
  
Scranton	
   Times,	
   L.P.	
   v.	
   Wilkes-‐Barre	
   Pub.	
   Co.,	
   2009	
   WL	
   3100963,	
   at	
   *5	
   (M.D.	
   Pa.,	
   Sep.	
   23,	
  
2009)	
  (agreeing	
  with	
  Second	
  Circuit’s	
  interpretation	
  in	
  NBA).	
  
7. 650	
  F.3d	
  876	
  (2d	
  Cir.	
  2011).	
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statements of the Supreme Court in International News, which it parsed in
great detail, while at the same time underemphasizing the peculiarities of the
situation that had prompted the Court in International News to choose the
framework that it did. In the end, its decision did surprisingly little to clarify
the scope, structure, or indeed analytical basis of the hot news doctrine. The
decision however does send an important signal to future litigants: that the hot
news doctrine is today an unviable stand-alone claim in all but a very few
situations.
In this Essay, I attempt to disaggregate the Second Circuit’s decision in
Barclays Capital to show that while the court may have reached the right
conclusion in the end (a position I have argued for previously8), its reasoning
to reach that conclusion is rather confusing, while at the same time a rich
source of information about the future of hot news doctrine. At every stage of
its analysis, the Second Circuit went to significant lengths to cabin the reach of
the doctrine quite considerably, despite reiterating that it was not abrogating it
altogether. In analyzing the opinion, I thus consider the possibility that the
court may have been signaling the gradual demise of the doctrine, which as a
creature of the common law must go through a fuller process of desuetude
before being officially “overruled.” Part I sets out the sources of confusion,
doubt, and disagreement that characterize the court’s two opinions in Barclays
Capital. Part II then attempts to draw lessons from the Second Circuit’s
opinion for the future of common law intellectual property and the use of the
common law process in developing intellectual property rules.	
  
I.	
  DOUBT,	
  DENIAL,	
  AND	
  DISAGREEMENT:	
  THE	
  SECOND	
  CIRCUIT	
  DECISION	
  	
  
The facts of Barclays Capital v. Theflyonthewall.com were somewhat
unexceptional for the Internet age. The plaintiffs were financial services firms
engaged in the business of generating extensive research about the activities
and prospects of numerous publicly traded companies, which they provided to
their clients for a fee. Each morning, they produced their research reports,
which summarized their findings and contained daily recommendations as to
“the wisdom of purchasing, holding, or selling securities” of various
companies that formed the subject of the research.9 The defendant website was
a subscription news service. Through various means, the defendant obtained
the plaintiffs’ research reports, and then posted the recommendations carried
therein on its own website exclusively for its own subscribers. Each day, this
occurred before the plaintiffs made their reports and recommendations
available to the general public, but after the plaintiffs released their reports to
their own subscribers. Most importantly though, in posting the plaintiffs’
recommendations, the defendant always attributed the recommendations to
their source, i.e., plaintiffs, since the value and credibility of the
recommendations emanated entirely from the plaintiff firms’ expertise.10

8. Shyamkrishna	
   Balganesh,	
  “Hot	
  News”:	
  The	
  Enduring	
  Myth	
  of	
  Property	
  in	
  News,	
  111	
  
Colum.	
  L.	
  Rev.	
  419,	
  475–76	
  (2011)	
  [hereinafter	
  Balganesh,	
  “Hot	
  News”].	
  
9. Barclays	
  Capital,	
  650	
  F.3d	
  at	
  879.	
  
10. Id.	
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Worried that the defendant’s actions would impact their business model,
the plaintiffs commenced an action under federal copyright law and New
York’s hot news misappropriation doctrine against the defendant website. At
trial, the defendant readily conceded copyright infringement, but disputed that
its actions amounted to a misappropriation of hot news.11 After a bench trial,
the district court found for the plaintiffs, and the defendant then appealed.12
As many predicted, on appeal the Second Circuit reversed. Yet, its path in
getting there was far from simple. Its reasoning seemed to be characterized by
an uneasiness with the hot news doctrine as a whole, coupled with its belief
that its prior opinion resurrecting International News, i.e., its opinion in NBA,
had added to the confusion. To complicate matters even further, the panel
disagreed on its understanding of “free-riding” and “competition,” resulting in
one judge (Judge Raggi) writing a separate concurrence. In what follows, I
attempt to disaggregate these various influences on the court’s reasoning.
A. Doubt
It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the Second Circuit—both
majority and concurrence—approached the hot news doctrine with a dubitante
mindset. A traditional “dubitante” opinion is one where a judge is unhappy
with a proposition of law, but remains unwilling for some reason to repudiate
it.13 To be sure, the majority in Barclays Capital commenced its discussion by
observing that it was not addressing the viability of the doctrine, and that it was
“without the authority” to repudiate it. Nonetheless, it went on to add that if it
were called upon to reconsider the doctrine it might have certified the issue to
the state court, thereby suggesting that it was not at the same time expressly
affirming the viability of the doctrine in refusing to discuss the issue.14
Additionally, in their substantive discussions of the doctrine, both opinions
went to some length to lay out what they perceived to be major problems with
the doctrine.
Given its reluctance (or inability) to examine the viability of the doctrine,
the court chose to focus on the question of federal copyright preemption.
Specifically, it came to focus its attention on the “extra elements” test—
whether the doctrine added a dimension to the entitlement beyond the rights
covered by copyright law, for it to survive preemption.15 And here, both
opinions registered their most obvious doubts with the doctrine.
The majority began by noting how International News, despite its having
little value as precedent after Erie, nonetheless exerted a good deal of influence
on the structure of the doctrine, since the court in NBA had consciously
structured the New York version of the doctrine around International News.16
11. Id.	
  at	
  880.	
  
12. For	
   the	
   district	
   court’s	
   opinion,	
   see	
   Barclays	
   Capital	
   Inc.	
   v.	
   Theflyonthewall.com,	
  
700	
  F.	
  Supp.	
  2d	
  310	
  (S.D.N.Y.	
  2010).	
  
13. See	
  Lon	
  Fuller,	
  Anatomy	
  of	
  the	
  Law	
  147	
  (1968);	
  Jason	
  J.	
  Czarnezki,	
  The	
  Dubitante	
  
Opinion,	
  39	
  Akron	
  L.	
  Rev.	
  1,	
  2	
  (2006).	
  
14. Barclays	
  Capital,	
  650	
  F.3d	
  at	
  890.	
  
15. Id.	
  at	
  893–98.	
  
16. Id.	
  at	
  894.	
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The problem with this “ghostly” influence of International News on the
doctrine, to the court, lay in its emphasis on the moral dimension of the
defendant’s actions, which the Supreme Court had dubbed “unfair” and as
amounting to reaping without sowing.17 Over the years, this rhetoric had come
to be absorbed by various courts, resulting in the gradual expansion of the
doctrine. This emphasis on unfairness came to influence the preemption
analysis too, despite its being irrelevant to the issue since it did not add a
substantive extra element to the analysis in any way. Additionally, on the issue
of preemption, the majority also worried that allowing anything other than a
very narrowly tailored hot news doctrine would disrupt Congress’s desire to
ensure national uniformity in intellectual property law. The hot news doctrine,
the court worried, might result in states recognizing and enforcing it to varying
degrees, producing a good deal of uncertainty and “patchwork protection” that
was avoidable.18 On the face of things, the majority opinion sets this concern
up as a matter of construction. In practical terms though, the court was using it
to reiterate its doubts about the viability of the doctrine outside a very limited
domain.
Judge Raggi’s concurring opinion made these early doubts rather explicit.
In her view, the hot news doctrine, as formulated by the court in NBA, failed to
identify any extra elements that were qualitatively different from copyright
law. Nonetheless, much like the majority, she concluded that she was bound by
the prior opinion and proceeded accordingly.19
Both opinions therefore began their discussion with a good deal of
skepticism about the doctrine—both structural and substantive, while
acknowledging their inability to repudiate the doctrine. It was thus in some
sense inevitable (and predictable) that this constrained skepticism (i.e., the
dubitante mindset) would deeply influence their construction and application
of the doctrine, while forcing them to preserve it nominally for the future.
B. Denial
Having begun with a discernible degree of skepticism about the doctrine,
the majority opinion then proceeded to make sense of hot news
misappropriation as formulated by the court in NBA. And here too, the court
expressed its misgivings. In NBA, the court had attempted to parse the
language and logic of International News to formulate a version of the
misappropriation doctrine for New York that consisted of five independent
elements. Indeed, it went to some length to describe the analytical bases of
each element and then root them individually in the language of International
News. The court in Barclays Capital however found this entire exercise
redundant, and additionally found a simple way to disregard it: by
characterizing it as dictum.
In NBA the court eventually found for the defendant. Yet before doing so,
it set out the constituent elements of a hot news misappropriation claim—
17. Id.	
  at	
  894–95.	
  
18. Id.	
  at	
  898.	
  
19. Id.	
  at	
  908–11	
  (Raggi,	
  J.,	
  concurring).	
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twice—then proceeded to describe how these elements satisfied the copyright
preemption analysis, and only thereafter applied the elements to the facts of the
dispute before it.20 To the Second Circuit in Barclays Capital however, this
represented both a redundancy and a deep inconsistency. The court concluded
that the five-element test of NBA was not at all essential to the court’s
conclusion, and despite NBA’s characterization of the test as its “hold[ing],”
the court now characterized it as dictum.21 Additionally, the court also found
the two versions of the five-element test that the NBA court had laid down to
exhibit a variation in that one quoted language from International News that
seemed to modify how the elements might be applied.22 Putting these two
moves together strategically allowed the court in Barclays Capital to at once
both disregard the elements of the action as formulated in NBA and at the same
time choose those parts of the opinion in NBA that it found most conducive to
its views on the future of the action, by identifying what it thought to be the
real holding of the NBA decision. To the court, the real holding of NBA lay in
its preemption analysis, and its finding that the defendant in that case
(Motorola) was not free-riding on the plaintiff’s efforts.23
While this was no doubt an interesting bit of legal maneuvering, it reveals
an obvious tension within the majority’s opinion. Recall that the majority had
begun its discussion by noting that it was powerless to repudiate the doctrine
because it was “bound” by the NBA court’s statements that the doctrine
survives.24 Yet in relation to the five-element test, the majority was willing to
characterize those portions of the very same opinion (i.e., NBA) as dictum in
order to deny its binding nature. If the five-part analysis was nothing more than
a “sophisticated observation[] in aid”25 of the court’s analysis of preemption,
and therefore not integral to its actual conclusions, why could the same not be
said of the NBA court’s general observation that the doctrine survives in New
York, since in the end it concluded that the plaintiff’s claim there was
nonetheless preempted? In other words, if the five-element analysis was
peripheral to the preemption issue, so too should have been the question of the
doctrine’s “survival.” It is indeed here that the court tips its hand to reveal that
it is in reality trying to consciously constrain the doctrine.
It is important to note that the concurring opinion categorically refused to
buy this logic. Judge Raggi remained unwilling to go along with the majority’s
categorization of the five-part test as dictum and adopted the position that the
test was “necessary to the opinion’s result.”26
C. Disagreement
In denying that the test as formulated by NBA was binding precedent, the
majority opinion in Barclays Capital thus effectively rejected the hot news
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

NBA	
  v.	
  Motorola	
  Inc.,	
  105	
  F.3d	
  841,	
  845,	
  852	
  (2d	
  Cir.	
  1997).	
  
Barclays	
  Capital,	
  650	
  F.3d	
  at	
  898–99.	
  
Id.	
  at	
  900–01.	
  
Id.	
  at	
  901–02.	
  
Id.	
  at	
  890.	
  
Id.	
  at	
  901.	
  
Id.	
  at	
  911	
  (Raggi,	
  J.,	
  concurring)	
  (emphasis	
  added).	
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doctrine as formulated there, i.e., the five-factor test. Yet, neither did the court
offer its own independent formulation of the doctrine as an alternative. The
majority opinion instead moved to stating and applying what it thought to be
the real holding in NBA: that there was no “free-riding” by the defendant, as a
result of which the claim was effectively preempted by copyright law.27
The portion of the NBA opinion that the majority thought itself to be
bound by was limited to the court’s holding that the element of “free-riding”
by a defendant was necessary for a hot news claim to survive federal
preemption. In NBA, the court had found that the defendant was not free-riding
on the plaintiff’s efforts because it had collected its facts (i.e., the material
sought to be protected) on its own, using “[its] own resources,” and thereupon
found the plaintiff’s hot news claim preempted.28 Seizing on this, the majority
in Barclays Capital reasoned that since the plaintiff firms were not in the
business of merely transmitting recommendations, but were instead actively
making them, while the defendant website was merely transmitting these
recommendations with attribution to its subscribers, the defendant was in
similar vein not free-riding on the plaintiff’s efforts. Had the plaintiff been in
the business of also transmitting information, that it was not itself producing,
to its subscribers, the court concluded it would have been willing to find freeriding.29
Simple as this reasoning may seem, it masks several complexities
underlying the very idea of free-riding. The majority in Barclays Capital
placed much emphasis on the idea of “acquiring material” that the Supreme
Court had used in describing the hot news claim in International News.30
Creation, the court reasoned now, was different from acquisition—implying
that while the defendant’s behavior might amount to free-riding in some
general sense, it was not an act of free-riding on the acquisitive efforts of the
plaintiff. While this may certainly be true as an analytical matter, it is not clear
from the court’s reasoning why this limitation ought to matter much in the
law’s understanding of free-riding. Why, in other words, is the acquisitive
effort more worthy of protection than the creative effort? The answer cannot
simply be that it is copyright law’s prerogative to protect creativity, since we
are by necessity in the realm of non-expressive information (i.e., ideas, facts,
data) that is by definition outside the domain of copyright law. The court
sought its answer instead in the language of International News, which it
mined in some detail, and in the process focused on the Supreme Court’s
observation that the plaintiff’s profits in that case were being diverted “at the
point” when they were to be reaped, to conclude that this was absent here,
revealing an absence of free-riding.31 That the court in Barclays Capital felt a
good deal of discomfort with its approach is adequately borne out in its
observation at the end of its attempted mining of International News, that it
was doing so not to treat International News as a “statement of law,” but
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.	
  at	
  902–06.	
  
NBA	
  v.	
  Motorola,	
  Inc.,	
  105	
  F.3d	
  841,	
  854	
  (1997).	
  
Barclays	
  Capital,	
  650	
  F.3d	
  at	
  905–06.	
  
Id.	
  at	
  903.	
  
International	
  News	
  Service	
  v.	
  Associated	
  Press,	
  248	
  U.S.	
  215,	
  240	
  (1918).	
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instead to focus on the differences between that case and the present one.32 In
effect, the Court avoided answering a rather fundamental question about the
nature of “free riding” on which it placed all its normative emphasis.
As I have argued before, the idea of free-riding in International News had
nothing whatsoever to do with the distinction between an acquisition and
creation.33 It originated instead from the context of the problem that the Court
was trying to solve there: a collective action problem. The free-riding thus was
not about the nature of the plaintiff’s actions that the defendant was relying on,
but instead about the fact that it was enabling the defendant to be enriched at
the plaintiff’s expense. This enrichment in turn was problematic because it
diminished parties’ incentives to enter into a collective enterprise that
necessitated continued cooperation for its functioning. The key to Barclays
Capital was thus the complete absence of a collective action problem, not the
absence of an enrichment at one party’s expense. The majority’s distinction
between “making” the recommendations and “breaking” them to the public
would have been better served by focusing on the absence of direct
competition.
Judge Raggi’s concurring opinion seemed to be headed in the right
direction when she disagreed with the majority’s reliance on free-riding and
focused instead on the element of direct competition. Noting, in no uncertain
terms, that she was not convinced by the majority’s acquisition/creation
distinction, since the plaintiffs seemed to be performing both roles, she
eventually found the plaintiff’s claim to be preempted owing to the absence of
any direct competition between the parties.34 Nonetheless, her opinion does
little to define the idea of direct competition or indeed situate it within the
overall skein of what the doctrine is trying to achieve. The opinion
simplistically notes that “direct competition is the substantial similarity of the
products in satisfying the relevant market demand.”35 And again, much like
the majority opinion, Judge Raggi’s opinion too placed much emphasis on the
fact that the defendant was attributing the recommendations to the plaintiff—
which it took to indicate the absence of direct competition between them.
Direct competition was indeed the key to the issue in Barclays Capital.
Yet, it involved more than just the question of demand substitution. What the
Court in International News was really focusing on in its discussion of
competition was hardly just the final products/services of the parties, but
instead their position vis-à-vis each other as “competitors.” This distinction is
more than just theoretical. What rendered the defendant’s free-riding an act of
unjust enrichment in International News was the reality that it allowed the
defendant to obtain a competitive advantage at the plaintiff’s expense—one
that could have had the long term effect of jeopardizing the very structure of
newsgathering, if left unchecked. The only thing that seemed to keep Judge
Raggi from finding direct competition between the parties then was the fact
32. Barclays	
  Capital,	
  650	
  F.3d	
  at	
  905.	
  
33. See	
   Balganesh,	
   “Hot	
   News,”	
   supra	
   note	
   8,	
   at	
   438–71	
   (framing	
   question	
   instead	
   in	
  
terms	
  of	
  unjust	
  enrichment	
  and	
  unfair	
  competition).	
  
34. Barclays	
  Capital,	
  650	
  F.3d	
  at	
  912–15	
  (Raggi,	
  J.,	
  concurring).	
  
35. Id.	
  at	
  913.	
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that the plaintiff was doing no more than disseminating its own
recommendations, instead of also carrying those of other research firms as
well. In the end, her reasoning thus boiled down to essentially the same
acquisition/creation distinction that the majority had relied on.
***
The Barclays Capital opinions are thus replete with observations hinting
at the court’s skepticism with the hot news misappropriation doctrine. In many
ways, the court seemed do all but actually repudiate the doctrine. It declared
the five-factor formulation from NBA non-binding, repeatedly emphasized the
extremely “narrow” nature of the doctrine, admonished courts for expanding
the doctrine by placing too much emphasis on the idea of “unfair[ness],” and
finally relied heavily on an understanding of “free-riding” that seems largely
conclusory and certainly incapable of meaningful replication in the future. To
its credit though, not once did the court in Barclays Capital use the phrase
“property” to describe the interest at stake, unlike in the NBA opinion, where
the court sought to categorically alter Justice Pitney’s original understanding of
the doctrine.36 But why then did the court not take one small step more, and
abrogate the doctrine altogether, when its distaste for the doctrine and its
generativity seemed more than apparent? One suspects that the answer lies in
the gradual process by which a common law doctrine comes to be overruled,
which the court was likely signaling in no small measure.
In dissenting from the majority opinion in a major antitrust case a few
years ago, Justice Breyer described the common law process of overruling as
one where a court would “issue decisions that gradually eroded the scope and
effect of the rule in question, which might eventually lead the courts to put the
rule to rest.”37 Gradual narrowing and asphyxiation of a doctrine over time
such that it comes to be applied and relied on by parties with rarity—and
thereby falls into desuetude—is thus a precondition to its actual
repudiation/abrogation. Two reasons motivate this approach. The first is the
incrementalism inherent in the formulation of the rule, a tentativeness that
allows the process to remain sensitive to changes in the context within which
the rule is likely to be applied. The second is the principle of stare decisis,
which, while not always binding as a rule, nonetheless constrains later courts
from straying from their previous decisions unless absolutely necessary, and
demands that courts try and reconcile any changes that they make to the
doctrine with their previous decisions. In many ways both these influences
seemed to be at play in Barclays Capital.
The hot news doctrine had evolved as a solution to a problem very
specific to the newspaper industry—a fact recognized soon after the doctrine,
and alluded to by the Second Circuit in Barclays Capital as well. Yet over
time, the doctrine had come to be expanded and applied to new contexts and
subject matter, in the process detaching it from its moorings in the newspaper

36. See	
  Balganesh,	
  “Hot	
  News,”	
  supra	
  note	
  8,	
  at	
  423	
  (explaining	
  original	
  formulation	
  of	
  
hot	
  news	
  doctrine).	
  
37. Leegin	
   Creative	
   Leather	
   Prods.,	
   Inc.	
   v.	
   PSKS,	
   Inc.,	
   127	
   S.	
   Ct.	
   2705,	
   2737	
   (2007)	
  
(Breyer,	
  J.,	
  dissenting).	
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industry and converting it into a stand-alone cause of action. In rolling it back,
the court thus had to be sensitive to the expectations that this expansion—
problematic as it may have been—had likely created among actors. The court
was also explicit about its reliance on stare decisis, and as discussed above,
went to some lengths to limit the applicability of the principle, while at least
nominally adhering to it. In short then, the need for gradualism was readily
apparent in the court’s approach.
From this perspective, the opinions in Barclays Capital can be seen as
signaling to litigants and lower courts the impending repudiation of hot news
misappropriation. Despite the court’s recognition of a narrow set of cases
where the action might still survive,38 its repudiation of the five-factor formula
and its extended focus on the question of preemption makes it highly likely
that even if a future case meeting the court’s criteria should arise, it might not
survive the close scrutiny that the court insists all hot news claims be subjected
to. Things might have indeed been much clearer (and perhaps more helpful), if
the court had made explicit its intentions, rather than forcing them to be
gleaned ex post. All the same, it must be remembered that the common law
develops through what a court actually does rather than what it merely says, a
reality that the Barclays Capital court seems to have affirmed in more ways
than one.
II.	
  LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE OF COMMON LAW INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
Taking a step back now from the specifics of the decision in Barclays
Capital, it is worth considering what the court’s approach and the reasoning it
employed to reach its conclusions in that case mean for the future of common
law intellectual property—an area of law that I have previously argued
embodies an underappreciated source of flexibility and pragmatism.39 While
Barclays Capital may have sounded the beginning of the end for the hot news
misappropriation doctrine, I believe that its lessons for common law
intellectual property lawmaking are, by contrast, ones of optimism. In this Part,
I consider two in particular.
A. The Virtues of Caution
Contrasting the language and tone of the Second Circuit’s opinion in NBA
to that of its most recent one in Barclays Capital reveals a noticeable
difference. In declaring that the hot news doctrine had indeed survived in New
York, and adapting it to the modern environment, the court in NBA sounds
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39. See	
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optimistic, proactive, and willing to see where the doctrine is likely to head in
the future. NBA was decided just around the time that the Internet era began to
come into its own. Nearly a decade and a half later, the court’s tone in
Barclays Capital is markedly different: skeptical, risk-averse, and perhaps
most importantly reactive.
Yet reactive to what exactly? In the time since the doctrine’s resurrection
in NBA, much had indeed changed in the information environment. The
Internet and the emergence of digital technology had resulted in a variety of
changes to traditional intellectual property—i.e., copyright law—almost all of
which were brought about through legislative activity in the area.40 One
consequence of the digital world, however, was its challenge to the traditional
business models of participants in key information industries: music, movies,
and, most recently, newsgathering and reporting. And it was precisely to
protect these traditional models that the common law had been called into
service, in the process moving it in new directions and into altogether new
areas.41 This posed an obvious problem. The common law had emerged within
certain contexts and developed concepts from within those contexts. As it
came to be applied to new areas, its concepts no doubt remained facially
adaptable. All the same, the reasons for their formal existence and validity
started becoming less and less apparent. When this normally happens, a
common law court usually has three main options: it can (i) create new law in
an effort to take account of the new reasons and contexts, (ii) abdicate the
doctrinal areas in question to the legislature on the theory that “[c]ourts are illequipped”42 to the task, or (iii) proceed with caution, enabling the law to fully
grapple with the new context, before moving in either direction.
The court in Barclays Capital can be seen as adopting the third of these
approaches. The court was no doubt aware of how the hot news doctrine had
come to be applied to new contexts, including the Internet, and was invoked
for interferences with traditional business models, especially by the newspaper
industry. Yet, it certainly did nothing at all to expand the doctrine or to adapt it
to the new circumstances. Neither did it fully abrogate the doctrine, and return
all intellectual property lawmaking to the legislature. Instead, the court
effectively hit the pause button on the continued expansion of the doctrine in
order to allow participants (and indeed the law as a whole) to grapple more
fully with the changed environment.
Caution has long been known to be a virtue of the common law.43 The
experimentation that incremental lawmaking allows for remains valuable only
40. See,	
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   Glynn	
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  of	
  Digital	
  Millennium	
  Copyright	
  Act	
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  protection).	
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if it allows for the process to periodically revisit its basic premises and change
direction, or slow things down under conditions of uncertainty. Disentangled
from its formal rhetoric, Barclays Capital is a strikingly good example of this
happening in the world of common law intellectual property.
B. The Bi-Directionality of Common Law Incrementalism in Intellectual
Property
While incremental lawmaking remains a hallmark of the common law, its
advantages are often thought to be offset by a heightened amount of path
dependence that is intrinsic to the process.44 Principles such as stare decisis,
and the rules of precedent and authority are thus thought to ensure that even
when the law develops gradually, it does so in one particular direction, without
ever allowing for a measured rollback. Creativity in adjudication is believed to
be fraught with the possibility that later courts will come to mechanically
follow suit, for no reason other than that the law exists.45 This is in turn
thought to be especially problematic in relation to intellectual property and the
creation of entitlements in informational resources, given the rapidity with
which the interests and needs of society in the area tend to fluctuate. In rolling
back the hot news misappropriation doctrine, Barclays Capital shows that this
need not be true—and that lawmaking in the common law style is truly a twoway street, even in the area of intellectual property.
Concerns about path dependence and unidirectional development in the
common law all too easily disregard the reality that the common law is more
than just an adaptable body of law—it is also a malleable process. What this
means is that the process of reasoning that common law courts employ derives
from a multiplicity of sources, some formal and others substantive. The precise
mix and hierarchy of these sources, however, remains the prerogative of the
common law judge, and the astute common law judge, as a pragmatist
grounded in the realities of society, is meant to find a way to reach the decision
deemed most appropriate to the situation and context.46 Common law
rulemaking is thus hardly mechanical in nature, and indeed very rarely admits
of a single “right” answer (though it may readily admit of several “wrong”
ones). Embedded within the process are a number of important procedural
safeguards, all of which are directed at endowing the judge with the flexibility
needed to overcome a path dependent form of decisionmaking. The
holding/dicta distinction is a particularly important one, and Barclays Capital
all too readily seized on it. Another similar well-known device is the process of
distinguishing a case based on its facts.
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Consequently, common law intellectual property lawmaking need not be a
one way street that favors expansionism and the grant of private entitlements at
the cost of the public domain, or indeed one that does not allow for a preexisting entitlement framework to be dismantled retrospectively if necessary.
Barclays Capital serves to illustrate this reality. The Demsetzian account of
legal rules, under which a regime develops when the benefits that it generates
for actors outweigh its costs, has long struggled to identify a good example of
its reversibility, i.e., a situation where a legal regime comes to be dismantled
when its costs outweigh its benefits.47 Barclays Capital might suggest that hot
news misappropriation doctrine is one.
CONCLUSION: SOME UNANSWERED QUESTIONS	
  	
  
The Second Circuit’s opinion in Barclays Capital unquestionably centers
around two important messages: one, that the hot news misappropriation
doctrine should not be readily extended to new contexts and situations; and
two, that the doctrine may well be on the tail-end of its lifecycle. At the same
time though, in failing to engage with some of the broader, structural issues
relating to the doctrine more directly, the opinion leaves several rather
important, and functionally significant, questions open and unanswered.
First, the court consciously avoids telling us what the structural basis of
the doctrine was and is. While this may have been of secondary importance in
light of the court’s own cabining of the doctrine, it nonetheless remains
functionally relevant until such time as the doctrine is completely abrogated—
especially since the court’s own opinion leaves open the possibility that a
future court might resurrect the doctrine when needed. The court refrains from
describing the interest in “property” terms, and instead characterizes it as a
“tort.”48 Yet, this presents its own set of analytical complications—involving
the identification of a domain of wrongdoing, wrongfulness, and harm, none of
which the court had to grapple with. In my previous work, I characterized
courts’ analytical description of the hot news doctrine in property terms as the
“enduring myth” that the doctrine had been developed to create property rights
in the news. In his response to my piece, Professor Richard Epstein disagreed
that there was indeed any enduring myth about the doctrine’s property status,
and noted that courts and scholars have come to understand that a “monolithic
conception” of property could not explain the hot news doctrine.49 Whether the
myth has indeed been dispelled or not, Barclays Capital moves the question
into the realm of a continuing mystery, by at once both disagreeing with the
decision in NBA (that had treated the doctrine as a “property” based one), and
failing to explicate the basis for the doctrine independently.
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Second and perhaps more importantly, Barclays Capital does not address
the First Amendment and free speech implications of the hot news doctrine,
either directly or indirectly. Despite the defendant’s raising the issue on appeal,
and indeed several amicus briefs making it the focus of their interventions,50
the court seems to have thought it wholly unnecessary to its decision—given
its avowed doctrinal focus on the question of federal copyright preemption.
Whether and how the First Amendment influences the doctrine is more than
just an academic question, and indeed ties back to the analytical basis of the
doctrine.51 It may well have been that the First Amendment was not implicated
in the dispute, once the court found the plaintiff’s claim to have been
preempted altogether by copyright law. Nonetheless, given the court’s refusal
to abrogate the doctrine in its entirety, the question is sure to resurface in the
future, if the doctrine were ever successfully relied on in the narrow set of
cases for which the court seemed to let it survive. Given its reexamination of
the roots of the doctrine, the court in Barclays Capital would have done well to
address the First Amendment question, even if only in dicta.
Sadly enough then, despite its extensive discussion of the doctrine, its
origins, and its future, the court in Barclays Capital fails to address what are
perhaps two of the most complex and important issues relating to the doctrine.
Nonetheless, taken as a whole, the case is a perfect illustration of the “genius
of the common law”52 as a process of incremental, context-specific rule
development that over time works itself pure and allows for adaptation as the
particular needs of society change.
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